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1 Introduction
Beyond the mere concern for individual differences or disparities in outcomes,
which has dominated distributive concerns for many decades, the theory of
equality of opportunity (Dworkin, 1981a,b; Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989) puts
individual responsibility in the forefront when assessing situations of economic
advantage and disadvantage. It is argued that outcomes such as income level, ed-
ucation attainment or health status, are determined by factors or variables that
are beyond individuals’ responsibility (so-called circumstances) and by factors
for which individuals are deemed responsible (so-called effort or responsibility
variables). Inequalities that are due to circumstances are deemed ethically un-
acceptable while those arising from efforts are not considered offensive. That
is, the ‘ideal’ situation or benchmark is not perfect equality per se, as in the
measurement of inequality of outcome, but a distribution where efforts are re-
warded adequately and the effect of circumstances is compensated for, so that
only disparities due to efforts remain.
Both attitude survey research (see, e.g., Schokkaert and Devooght (2003) and
Gaertner and Schwettmann (2007)), and experimental evidence (see Cappelen et
al (2010)) provide strong evidence that, in judging income distributions, people
largely distinguish between circumstances and efforts in the way suggested by
equality of opportunity theories. For instance, Cappelen et al (2010) elicit
information on what people hold each other responsible for, by means of a
dictator game where the distribution phase is preceded by a production phase,
and find that a large majority of the participants did not hold people responsible
for the randomly assigned price, an impersonal factor beyond individual control,
but did hold them responsible for their choice of working time.
This evidence about the social preferences people endorse should be dis-
tinguished from the influence of inequality of opportunity on preferences for
redistribution, political orientation and actual behavior. A growing amount of
empirical evidence shows that preferences for redistribution and political ori-
entation are shaped by fairness concerns. For instance, Alesina and La Fer-
rara (2005) show for the United States that people who believe that individual
economic success is related to individual effort rather than family background
or luck, have lower preferences for redistribution, while Alesina and Angeletos
(2005), using data from the World Value Survey, find that fairness perceptions
are associated with the individuals’ political orientation: when people believe
that effort is the main determinant of economic advantage, redistribution and
taxes are low, whereas in societies where people think of birth and connections
as the main determinants of economic success, taxes and redistribution will
be higher. Since the determinants of economic inequality (circumstances ver-
sus efforts) influence individual incentives, these determinants are related with
aggregate economic outcomes, such as economic growth. In its World Devel-
opment Report of 2006, the World Bank argues that income inequality due to
circumstances may lead to suboptimal accumulation of human capital and thus
to lower growth, while income inequality due to responsibility-related variables
may encourage individuals to invest in human capital and exert the largest effort
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possible (World Bank, 2005). In line with this, Marrero and Rodr´ıguez (2010),
using data for the U.S. from the Panel Survey on Income Dynamics, find that in-
come inequality due to effort enhances income growth, while the part of income
inequality which is accounted for by circumstances correlates negatively with
growth. Our concern in this paper is not which measure of inequality of oppor-
tunity is best suited to explain a particular phenomenon about reality (which
depends on the phenomenon under scrutiny and the way the world works), but
rather with the measures that have been proposed in the normative literature
dealing with the measurement of inequality of opportunity.
In recent years, we have seen an explosion of empirical literature that tries to
determine whether opportunities are equally distributed, and tries to measure
the extent of inequality of opportunity or the contribution of inequality of op-
portunity to total income inequality –see, e.g., Almas et al. (2011), Bjo¨rklund et
al. (2011), Bourguignon et al. (2007), Checchi and Peragine (2010), Devooght
(2008), Lefranc et al. (2008) and Pistolesi (2009). The measurement of equality
of opportunity entails many methodological and empirical questions that are
often difficult to resolve. Rather than addressing these issues in a systematic
and coherent manner, the literature has developed very rapidly in many seem-
ingly unrelated directions. As a result, there is often no explicit correspondence
between the theoretical principles and the measures put forth and employed to
empirically implement the equality of opportunity approach. In this survey we
bridge this gap by presenting and discussing in a systematic manner the main
conceptual issues and outline the solutions that have been proposed in the liter-
ature. Our analysis identifies and suggests several new possibilities to measuring
inequality of opportunity. However, we limit ourselves in several respects. First,
we discuss inequality of opportunity for income. Hence we do not address the
issues related to multi-dimensional outcomes, which arise for instance naturally
in the capabilities approach1. Other one-dimensional outcomes, such as health
and education have been analyzed using similar techniques as the ones we de-
scribe here2. Due to the one-dimensional focus the opportunity set to which
individuals have access contains only incomes, which drastically simplifies the
comparison of individual’s opportunity sets3. Second, we do not discuss the
design and evaluation of policies from an equality of opportunity perspective,
as this raises different important, complex and often model dependent issues 4.
The theoretical literature has pointed out that the idea of equality of op-
portunity embodies two basic principles. The compensation principle, which
demands that inequalities due to circumstances be eliminated and the reward
principle, which is concerned about how to reward efforts amongst individuals
1See Schokkaert (2009) for a recent discussion of the capabilities approach.
2See, e.g., Dias (2009) or Trannoy et al (2010) for health and Peragine and Serlenga (2008)
for education.
3For an overview of the literature on the evaluation of more general opportunity sets, see
Barbera et al (2004).
4Roemer (1998a) is a good starting point, and Pignataro (2011) provides a recent survey.
For theoretical contributions on optimal tax policy see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006 and
2007), Ooghe and Luttens (2007) or Jacquet and Van de gaer (2011). For the evaluation of
social programs see Van de gaer et al (2012).
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with identical circumstances.
Regarding the compensation principle, an important methodological issue
has to do with whether we want to take an ex-ante or rather an ex-post approach
to compensation. The ex-post approach looks at each individual’s actual out-
come and is concerned with outcome differences amongst individuals with the
same responsibility characteristics –and different circumstances. This approach
is very demanding on the data since we need to observe responsibility variables.
When, as it is often the case, no direct observations on responsibility variables
are available, we need to impose working assumptions about the relationship
between responsibility characteristics and outcomes that enable the identifica-
tion of an underlying responsibility variable. The ex-ante approach, instead,
focuses on prospects, so there is equality of opportunity if all individuals face
the same set of opportunities (or sets that are equally valued), regardless of
their circumstances. The ex-ante approach is interesting per se if we believe
that opportunity ought to be measured by the set of opportunities that indi-
viduals face, but it is also useful when effort has not been exerted as yet. One
empirical advantage of this approach is that efforts need not be identified, since
outcome prospects are usually measured by some measure of centrality of the
distribution of the outcome amongst individuals with identical circumstances.
Using the framework in Fleurbaey and Peragine (2011), we illustrate their result
that the ex-ante and ex-post approach are incompatible.
Regarding the reward principle, the focal points in the literature are liberal
reward and utilitarian reward. The former says that the government should not
redistribute income between those that share all circumstance characteristics,
as their income differences are exclusively due to differences in efforts. The
latter says that we should not be concerned with (i.e. express zero inequality
aversion with respect to) income differences that are only due to differences in
efforts, such that we should only be concerned with the sum of the incomes of
those that only differ in terms of effort. We introduce a third reward principle,
“inequality averse reward”, which is motivated by either the stochastic nature
of incomes and risk aversion (see Lefranc et al (2009)) or the existence of unjus-
tified inequalities in incomes after conditioning on circumstances (see Roemer
(2010)). All three reward principles are shown to be incompatible with ex-post
compensation.
Several approaches to measure inequality of opportunity, based on informa-
tion on outcomes, circumstances and efforts have been proposed in the literature.
We distinguish direct measures that measure how much inequality remains when
only inequality due to circumstances is left from indirect measures that measure
how much inequality remains after opportunities are equalized. We also discuss
the rationale for the stochastic dominance and norm based approaches found in
the literature.
When researchers want to compute inequality of opportunity, they are con-
fronted with several difficulties. They have to decide which outcomes to focus
on, which variables are circumstances and which efforts. This is a normative
issue, but sensitivity analysis with respect to the circumstances-effort split helps
to establish the robustness of the results. Not all circumstances are always ob-
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served. Unobserved circumstances typically lead to an underestimation of the
amount of inequality of opportunity. Efforts are often unobserved and observed
efforts are correlated with circumstances. The former problem can be resolved
using a non-parametric technique proposed by Roemer (1993) or parametric
techniques (Bjo¨rklund et al. (2011) or Salvi (2007)). The latter is typically re-
solved using regression analysis, as suggested by Bourguignon et al. (2007). We
analyze the implications of these issues and the solutions used in the literature.
To give the reader a flavor of the kinds of results that can be obtained with the
various approaches, we discuss the empirical findings of some selected recent
studies. As the empirical literature is booming the last few years and several
new studies appear every month, no attempt is made to be exhaustive in the
overview of empirical findings.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 first uses a simplified ver-
sion of the framework recently developed by Fleurbaey and Peragine (2011)
to illustrate the incompatibilities between ex-post and ex-ante compensation
and between ex-post compensation and the different reward principles. The
next section discusses how the insights from the ex-post versus ex-ante compen-
sation debate and reward principles have been used to construct measures of
inequality of opportunity. Section 4 discusses several data imperfections: unob-
served circumstances, construction of measures of efforts, luck and econometric
error terms. Section 5 illustrates the issues discussed in the previous sections
by presenting the results of some empirical studies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Principles
In this section we introduce the major insights from the theoretical literature
on the evaluation of distributions of incomes from a perspective of equality of
opportunity. We assume that we only observe (or want to use) information
about individuals’ incomes, their circumstances and their efforts. In particular,
let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2 be the set of individuals. For each individual
k ∈ N , we observe yk ∈ R++, his income, aRk ∈ Rd
R
, a vector of character-
istics for which individual k is responsible (efforts) and aCk ∈ Rd
C
, a vector
of characteristics for which he is not responsible (circumstances). A type is a
set of individuals sharing the same circumstances: for every value of the dC-
dimensional vector aCk that occurs in the population, a type is defined.
5 Let
there be mC such types, indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . ,mC}. Similarly, a tranche is a
set of individuals sharing the same efforts: for every value of the dR-dimensional
vector aRk that occurs in the population, a new tranche is defined.
6 Let there
be mR such tranches, indexed by j ∈ {1, . . . ,mR}.
In this section we assume that incomes are exclusively determined by efforts
and circumstances such that all those having the same circumstances and ef-
forts obtain the same outcome. Hence, the relevant data can be summarized
5This definition of “type” was introduced by Roemer (1993).
6This definition of “tranche” was introduced by Peragine (2004).
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by the mC ×mR−dimensional matrix of incomes Y = [Yij ] ∈ Rm
C×mR
++ , giving
the income for each circumstance-effort combination occurring in the popula-
tion, and the matrix P = [Pij ], giving the frequency with which circumstance-
effort combination ij occurs in the population. Naturally, all Pij ≥ 0 and∑mR
j=1
∑mC
i=1 Pij = 1. The frequency of type i in the population is Pi. =
∑mR
j=1 Pij
and the frequency of tranche j is P.j =
∑mC
i=1 Pij . We only consider situations
where all Pij > 0.
7 Let P =
{
P ∈ RmC×mR++ |
∑mR
j=1
∑mC
i=1 Pij = 1
}
. Our pur-
pose is to find an ordering P of matrices Y for every P ∈ P. Observe that this
ordering is conditional on P ; in this section the types and tranches, as well as
the distribution of the population over types and tranches are kept fixed when
we compare different income matrices.
2.1 Ex-ante versus ex-post
The first fundamental idea in the literature on equality of opportunity is that
differences that are due to circumstances should be compensated. As stated by
Fleurbaey and Peragine (2011), compensation can be done using an ex-post or
ex-ante approach. Ex-post compensation tries to make the outcomes for those
individuals having the same effort as equal as possible. Formally,
EPC (Ex-Post Compensation): For all Y, Y ′ ∈ RmC×mR++ : Y P Y ′ if there
exists Y ′ij ≥ Yij ≥ Ylj ≥ Y ′lj with either the first or the last inequality holding
strict and for all ab /∈ {ij, lj} : Y ′ab = Yab.
The condition in the axiom requires that, for effort j, the distribution of out-
comes is more equal in matrix Y than in Y ′. Ex-ante compensation, on the
other hand, prefers redistribution from a type that is unambiguously better-off
to a type that is unambiguously worse-off.
EAC (Ex-Ante Compensation): For all Y, Y ′ ∈ RmC×mR++ : Y P Y ′ if (i) there
exists i and l such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,mR} : Yij ≥ Ylj and (ii) there exists
j, q ∈ {1, . . . ,mR} : Y ′ij > Yij , Ylq > Y ′lq and for all ab /∈ {ij, lq} : Y ′ab = Yab.
Condition (i) guarantees that in matrix Y type i is unambiguously better-off
than type l, while condition (ii) implies that the inequalities between types i
and l are larger in matrix Y ′ than in matrix Y .
While both conditions look reasonable, it has been shown by Fleurbaey and
Peragine that they are incompatible. To see this, consider the following outcome
matrices for a situation where we have 4 types and 2 tranches:
Y 1 =

20 15
15 10
30 6
25 1
 and Y 2 =

21 15
15 9
30 7
24 1
 .
7This is done to save on notation; otherwise most of the axioms listed below have to be
made conditional on the relevant Pij occurring in the axioms being strictly positive.
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Starting from Y 1, we observe that the first row has better opportunities than the
second and the third row has better opportunities than the fourth. Increasing
the inequalities between the first and second row (by increasing Y 111 and decreas-
ing Y 122) and increasing the inequalities between the third and fourth row (by
increasing Y 132 and decreasing Y
1
41) results in Y
2, such that, by EAC, we have
Y 1 P Y 2. Now, start from Y 2, increase the inequalities in the first column (by
decreasing Y 211 and increasing Y
2
41) and increase the inequalities in the second
column (by increasing Y 222 and decreasing Y
2
32) and we get Y
1. Hence, by EPC,
Y 2 P Y 1, contradicting our previous finding. We have thus illustrated the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Fleurbaey and Peragine (2011)): EPC and EAC are incom-
patible.
The existence of this incompatibility implies that, if one wants to evaluate out-
come matrices from the perspective of equality of opportunity, a choice has to
be made between ex-ante and ex-post compensation.
2.2 Reward principles
The second fundamental idea in the literature on equality of opportunity is that
efforts should be adequately rewarded. Liberal reward is the first and most
prominent reward principle in the axiomatic literature on fair allocations (see,
e.g., Bossert (1995), Fleurbaey (1995a) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)) and
fair social orderings (see, e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005, 2008)). It states
that government taxes and transfers should respect differences in incomes that
are due to differences in responsibility. Take two individuals belonging to the
same type but that have exerted different efforts resulting in different pre-tax
incomes. According to the liberal reward principle, the tax policy has to respect
the income differences that are due to differences in exerted effort, which implies
that these individuals should pay the same tax. Let Tij be tax on individuals of
type i and tranche j. The liberal reward principle can then be stated formally
as follows.
LR (Liberal Reward): ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,mC} : Tij = Tik for all j, k ∈ {1, . . . ,mR}.
It is easy to see that there is a tension between LR and EPC. Consider the
following income matrix Y 3, which gives before tax incomes in a situation with
2 types and 2 tranches:
Y 3 =
[
30 5
20 10
]
.
Suppose we want to use a tax policy to compensate for ex-post inequalities.
Within the first column of Y 3, this calls for a transfer from the first type to the
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second type. Within the second column, an opposite transfer is required. Conse-
quently, ex-post compensation can go against LR. Bossert (1995) and Fleurbaey
(1995a) have shown that the two principles are, in general, incompatible8.
Proposition 2 (Bossert (1995) and Fleurbaey (1995)): LR and EPC are in-
compatible.
A second reward principle which Fleurbaey (2008) calls utilitarian reward has
been used more frequently in the empirical literature. The principle says that
respecting the income differences that are due to differences in effort requires
zero inequality aversion with respect to differences in incomes that are due to
differences in efforts, hence we have to focus on the sum of the incomes of those
that share the same circumstances, leading to the following axiom9.
UR (Utilitarian Reward): For all Y, Y ′ ∈ RmC×mR++ : Y P Y ′ if there exists
i ∈ {1, . . . ,mC} such that ∑mRj=1 YijPij >∑mRj=1 Y ′ijPij and for all l 6= i we have∑mR
j=1 YljPlj =
∑mR
j=1 Y
′
ljPlj .
As shown by Fleurbaey and Peragine, utilitarian reward is incompatible with
ex-post compensation. To illustrate this, consider the following income matrices
for a situation where we have 2 types and 2 tranches:
Y 3 =
[
30 5
20 10
]
and Y 4 =
[
30− λ 5 + ε
20 + P22P21 ε 10− ε
]
with λ >
P12
P11
ε.
Observe that, for ε sufficiently small, the change from Y 3 to Y 4 represents a
decrease in inequality within the first and within the second column. Hence, by
EPC, Y 4 P Y 3. Next, in moving from Y 3 to Y 4 the change in the second row
is such that P21Y
4
21 + P22Y
4
22 = P21Y
3
21 + P22Y
3
22, while with the restriction on
λ, we have P11Y
4
11 + P12Y
4
12 < P11Y
3
11 + P12Y
3
12, such that by UR, Y
3 P Y 4,
contradicting our previous finding. Hence we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Fleurbaey and Peragine (2011)): UR and EPC are incompat-
ible.
A third reward principle explicitly rejects utilitarian reward by claiming that
some compensation is due even after taking circumstances into account. A first
reason (see Lefranc et al (2009)) forces us to widen the framework to include
random variation as a third factor leading to differences in incomes (apart from
8Originally the incompatibility was shown in the literature searching for first best alloca-
tion rules. To deal with LR in the context of social orderings, a richer model of the economy
is required in which the ordering uses information of the actual transfer system (see Fleur-
baey and Peragine (2011)). As we are unaware of any empirical application that takes this
information into account, we limit ourselves to pointing out the tension between LR and EPC.
9Theoretical contributions focus on utilities rather than incomes, hence the name of the
axiom.
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effort and circumstances): after conditioning on circumstances, incomes are
stochastic and since individuals are risk averse, we should evaluate opportu-
nity sets in a risk averse way. A second reasoning is ex-post and rejects liberal
and utilitarian reward as still some compensation is due after conditioning on
an incomplete list of circumstances. Roemer (2010) attacks the liberal reward
principle, because liberal reward holds that no more compensation should be
made than that needed to correct inequalities due to different (measured) cir-
cumstances. As such, current property rights are no more adjusted than is
necessary to compensate people for disadvantageous circumstances. His point
is that it is difficult to see why the current property rights should be the bench-
mark. Hence, he advocates not to focus on incomes, but to take an increasing
concave (inequality adverse) transformation of incomes as the relevant outcome
variable. This can be called an inequality-averse reward principle.
IAR (Inequality Averse Reward): For all Y, Y ′ ∈ RmC×mR++ : Y P Y ′ if there
exists i ∈ {1, . . . ,mC} and δ ∈ R++ such that Yij = Y ′ij − δ ≥ Yik = Y ′ik + δ
and for all ab /∈ {ij, ik} : Y ′ab = Yab.
Again, it is easy to see that this reward principle conflicts with EPC. Con-
sider the following income matrices for a situation with 2 types and 2 tranches.
Y 5 =
[
10 40
20 30
]
and Y 6 =
[
10 40
19 31
]
From IAR it follows immediately that Y 5 P Y 6, while from EPC, Y 6 P Y 5,
a contradiction. As a result, we have
Proposition 4 : IAR and EPC are incompatible.
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 illustrate the difficulty to reconcile EPC with reward
principles, a difficulty emphasized in Fleurbaey and Peragine (2011). No such
incompatibilities arise with EAC.
2.3 Luck
Luck is a complex and important factor, which determines most economic
outcomes. Many different factors have been put under the label “luck” by
economists -see, e.g. Meade (1974). As Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2009)
neatly explain, different forms of luck deserve different treatment. We distin-
guish between forms of luck that require full, partial or no compensation.
The first form of luck reflects Rawl’s idea of social lottery, i.e. economic
advantage that is due to factors related to the family or social origin one hap-
pens to fall into, such as family or social networks and influences. Such social
background luck is almost universally considered as a circumstance and ought
to be fully compensated for.
The second, genetic luck, captures Rawl’s concept of natural lottery, where
constituent characteristics of the individual, such as genetically inherited factors
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like talent, are responsible for differential success. These constituent attributes
are thought to be pre-determined and exogenous to the individual and so, ceteris
paribus, most authors agree that they are circumstances such that outcomes
should be equal regardless of them. This view is not uncontested, however. For
instance, Nozick (1974)’s view of self-ownership argues that individuals deserve
to benefit from their inborn traits.
The third corresponds to Dworkin’s brute luck, defined as those situations
where the individual cannot alter the probability that an event takes place. By
definition, the individual is not responsible for such events happening and thus
it seems reasonable to argue in favor of full compensation. However, since full
compensation of brute luck may entail huge redistribution, cause large distor-
tions thereby diminishing opportunities for all and implementation of compen-
sation for brute luck requires a lot of information about individuals which is
usually not available, some authors have put forward other, weaker justice re-
quirements. For instance, Vallentyne (2002) suggests to compensate only for
initial brute luck, that is, brute luck that occurs before individuals are deemed
responsible for their choices and preferences.10
The last form of luck is Dworkin’s option luck and arises when individuals
deliberately take risk, which is assumed to be calculated, isolated, anticipated
and avoidable. Since by definition risks of option luck are avoidable and taken
deliberately, some authors argue that the resulting differences in outcomes are
legitimate. Contrary to that, Fleurbaey (1995b) argues in favor of full com-
pensation because with option luck small errors of choices may involve dispro-
portionate penalties, which he considers unjust. In his recent book, though,
Fleurbaey (2008) provides arguments for partial compensation. He sees option
luck as consisting of two distinct components: on the one hand, the individual
decision to choose a lottery, which is a voluntary act and thus does not deserve
compensation, and on the other hand, the randomness intrinsic to any lottery,
which should be at least partially compensated for.
To summarize: social background luck and brute luck are circumstances.
Also genetic luck is generally considered to be a circumstance. Option luck is
either an effort or a partial circumstance.
3 Measures
The analysis in the previous section highlights the point made in Ooghe et al
(2007) that ex-post inequality of opportunity is concerned with the inequalities
within each column of Y , while ex-ante inequality of opportunity is concerned
with the inequalities between the rows of Y . This has an important implica-
tion: when effort is distributed independently of type 11, full equality of ex-post
10Vallentyne (2002) defines later brute luck as the brute lack that occurs after a ‘canonical’
moment (Arneson, 1990) where individuals become responsible for their choices and prefer-
ences. As Lefranc et al. (2009) suggest, as long as initial and later brute luck are related,
compensation for the former implies at least partial compensation also for the latter.
11Formally, for all j ∈ {1, ...,mR} and i, k ∈ {1, ...,mC} with i 6= k it must be that
pij/pi. = pkj/pk.
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opportunities (absence of inequalities within columns) implies full equality of
ex-ante opportunities (equal rows).
When comparing actual income distributions from the perspective of in-
equality of opportunity, the framework has to be adjusted to allow comparisons
between income distributions with different circumstance-effort distributions i.e.
with different matrices P . In addition, the framework should allow for unob-
served and random variables. Hence individual k ’s income, yk, is assumed to
depend on his circumstances aCk , his efforts, a
R
k , unobserved variables uk and a
random term ek, such that
yk = g
(
aCk , a
R
k , uk, ek
)
where g : Rd
C × RdR × R× R→ R++.
As the uk is unobserved, and the functional form g is unknown, the paramet-
ric approach imposes a functional form to estimate the equation, yielding the
function
ĝ
(
aCk , a
R
k , ek
)
where ĝ : Rd
C × RdR × R→ R++.
An estimate of yk, ŷk, can be obtained by setting ek equal to zero in the above
equation. Observe that the effect of the unobserved variable will be taken over
by the effect of observed circumstances and efforts, to the extent that these are
correlated with the unobserved variables. The rest of the effect of unobservables
as well as specification errors go into the estimated random variation, êk, which
is defined implicitly by the equation yk = ĝ
(
aCk , a
R
k , êk
)
. For some purposes,
it is convenient to estimate incomes as a function of, on the one hand, either
circumstances or efforts and, on the other hand, random variation:
ĝC
(
aCk , ek
)
where ĝC : Rd
C × R→ R++,
ĝR
(
aRk , ek
)
where ĝR : Rd
R × R→ R++.
These equations can be used to estimate incomes by, respectively, ŷCk and ŷ
R
k
by setting ek equal to zero. In the first (second) case, the effect of both omit-
ted efforts (circumstances) and unobservables are taken over by circumstances
(efforts) to the extent that these are correlated. The rest of their effect as well
as specification errors go into the estimated random variation, êCk (ê
R
k ) which
is defined implicitly by the equation yk = ĝ
C
(
aCk , ê
C
k
)
(yk = ĝ
R
(
aRk , ê
R
k
)
). For
future reference, let Nk. =
{
i ∈ N | aCi = aCk
}
and N.k =
{
i ∈ N | aRi = aRk
}
,
be the sets of individuals sharing the circumstances aCk (belong to the same
type) and efforts aRk (belong to the same tranche), respectively.
Following Pistolesi (2009), we can distinguish between a direct and indirect
approach to the measurement of inequality of opportunity. Other approaches in
the literature are based on stochastic dominance or deviations between actual
income and norm income. We discuss these approaches in turn and conclude
the section with an overview.
3.1 Direct measures
A first approach determines the amount of inequality of opportunity directly by
estimating the inequality in a counterfactual income distribution yc in which all
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inequalities due to differences in effort have been eliminated, such that only the
inequality that is due to differences in circumstances is left:
I (yc) . (1)
The crucial distinction between ex-ante and ex-post approaches lies in the
construction of the counterfactual yc. From an ex-ante viewpoint, we should
replace every individual’s actual income by some evaluation of his opportunity
set. Evidently, the value assigned to his opportunity set should not depend on
his own effort level.
So far the ex-ante approaches proposed to implement I (yc) rely mostly on
a non-parametric estimate of the value of an individual’s opportunity set. The
following proposals have been made in the literature:
yc1k =
1
|Nk.|
∑
i∈Nk.
yi, (2)
yc2k =
1
|Nk.|
∑
i∈Nk.
iy˜i, (3)
where y˜i is the i−th smallest level of income in the set Nk.. The first proposal
is due to Van de gaer (1993) and measures the value of the opportunity set by
the average income of those that are of the same type as the individual consid-
ered. This equals the surface under the Pen parade of the income distribution of
the individual’s type. The income distribution yc1, in which every individual’s
income is replaced by the mean income of his type is called the “smoothed in-
come distribution” by Checchi and Peragine (2010). As the specification implies
no inequality aversion for differences in incomes that are due to responsibility,
this specification is inspired by utilitarian reward. Since all income differences
that are due to circumstances are morally objectionable, Van de gaer proposes
an inequality index with infinite inequality aversion.12 Checchi and Peragine
(2010) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) point out that most standard inequal-
ity indices measuring inequality of opportunity as inequality in the smoothed
income distribution satisfy, apart from utilitarian reward an additional desir-
able property: when a transfer is made from an individual in a richer type to
an individual in a poorer type, regardless of the former individual being poorer
than the latter, inequality of opportunity falls. They express a preference for
the mean log deviation, because the index allows an exact decomposition of
total income inequality into (1) with (2) as the value of each individual’s op-
portunity set and a counterfactual in which all types have an opportunity set
of the same value13, since it is the only decomposable inequality measure that
is path independent (Foster and Shneyerov, 2000). Recently, Aaberge et al.
(2011) proposed a rank dependent measure (which includes the Gini coefficient
12As this ordering is only sensitive to what happens to the worst-off type, it does not satisfy
axioms EAC nor UR defined in section 2. It is straightforward to formulate a leximin extension
of the ordering that satisfies both axioms, however.
13This counterfactual is equal to (12) below.
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as a special case) as inequality index to measure ex-ante inequality in the vector
yc1. This procedure shares the two standard properties mentioned above, but
does not have the exact decomposition property. The second proposal, (3), was
formulated by Lefranc et al (2008) and measures the value of the opportunity
set by the surface under the generalized Lorenz curve of the income distribu-
tion of the individual’s type. As such, it embodies the inequality averse reward
principle. They propose a Gini coefficient to measure ex-ante inequality in the
vector yc2.
So far, the only parametric estimate of yc has been put forth by Ferreira
and Gignoux (2011). As efforts can be correlated with circumstances (see also
section 4.2.4), they propose to measure the value of an individual’s opportunity
set as
yc3k = ĝ
C
(
aCk , 0
)
, (4)
such that everybody’s opportunity set is valued by the reduced form estimate
of his income, given his circumstances and with the random term equal to its
expected value 0. As all within-type inequalities are eliminated in the vector yc3,
this is indeed an ex-ante approach: only between type inequalities are relevant.
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) interpret the resulting inequality measure as a
parametric estimate of (1) with (2) as the value of the opportunity sets, such
that, for the reasons given above they advocate the use of the mean log deviation
as inequality index.
An evident parametric alternative, closer in spirit to (2) would rely on the
estimate of ĝ rather than ĝC , and use
yc4k =
1
|Nk.|
∑
i∈Nk.
ĝ
(
aCi , a
R
i , 0
)
. (5)
Compared to the Ferreira and Gignoux measure described above, using yc4 in
a measure of inequality of opportunity (1), has the advantage that it deals with
the covariance between aC and aR in a more flexible type-dependent way. The
disadvantage is that, contrary to yc3 the estimation of ĝ, requires observations
on aR. We are unaware of any application of yc4.
From an ex-post point of view, to eliminate all inequalities that are due
to efforts, we replace every individual’s income by the income he could have
obtained if he would have put in a reference level of effort. Roemer (1993) was
the first to propose such an ex-post approach to compute (1) and used a non-
parametric procedure. He fixes a reference value for the responsibility variable
aR and defines set Na
R
k. =
{
i ∈ Nk. | aRi = aR
}
, which contains all individuals
that have the same circumstances as individual k and have the reference value
for the responsibility vector. Next define
yc5k
(
aR
)
=
1∣∣NaRk. ∣∣
∑
i∈NaRk.
yi, (6)
the average income of those that are of the same type as individual k and have
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the reference value for the responsibility characteristic.14 Applying (1) results
in an inequality measure whose value depends on the reference value aR, which
we denote by
I
(
yc5
(
aR
))
.
Roemer argues that the choice of reference value aR is arbitrary, and proposes
therefore the following averaged inequality measure:
1
n
n∑
l=1
I
(
yc5
(
aRl
))
. (7)
As all inequalities that are due to differences in circumstances are morally objec-
tionable, Roemer proposes to apply an infinite inequality aversion to compute
I
(
yc5
(
aRl
))
in (7) and puts I
(
yc5
(
aRl
))
equal to the lowest value of the vector
yc5
(
aRl
)
divided by mean income.15 In a recent paper, Aaberge et al. (2011)
propose to use a rank dependent measure to compute I
(
yc5(aRl )
)
in (7).
The ex-post approach to implement (1) semi-parametrically was proposed
by Pistolesi (2009)16 and it is obtained by setting a reference value for the
responsibility variable, aR in the estimate of the function g
(
aCk , a
R
k , ek
)
:
yc6k
(
aR
)
= ĝ
(
aCk , a
R, ek
)
. (8)
Compared to the non-parametric methodology, the parametric methodology has
the advantage that it always yields meaningful estimates for yc6k , even when the
combination
(
aCk , a
R
)
does not occur in the sample. Pistolesi experiments with
different inequality measures: he uses the Theil index, the mean log deviation,
the half squared coefficient of variation and the standard deviation of logs. In
the computation of yc6, ek can be set equal to zero, or to its estimated value êk.
The former amounts to treating ek as an effort variable with reference value zero,
the latter to treating it as a circumstance. Most authors take the mean value for
effort in the sample as the reference value aR. Following Roemer, one can use an
averaged inequality measure similar to (7), where yc6
(
aRl
)
replaces yc5
(
aRl
)
. We
are unaware of any application of such a direct parametric averaged inequality of
opportunity measure. There exist some theoretical results on the consequences
of taking different reference values in the context of particular models -see, e.g.,
Luttens and Van de gaer (2007), but the choice of reference value remains an
unsettled issue.
3.2 Indirect measures
A second approach determines the amount of inequality of opportunity indi-
rectly by comparing the inequality in the actual distribution of income, I (y),
14In case Na
R
k. = ∅ this procedure runs into difficulties. If Roemer’s identification axiom is
used to identify effort (see section 4.2.1) this does not occur.
15As it is only sensitive to the lowest income for each effort, the index does not satisfy EPC
as defined in section 2. It is easy to formulate a leximin extension that satisfies it, however.
16Schokkaert el al. (1998) already applied a similar procedure in a health context.
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to the inequality in a counterfactual income distribution where there is no in-
equality of opportunity I
(
yE0
)
. This results in the measure
ΘI
(
y, yEO
)
= I (y)− I (yEO) . (9)
Almost all applications of indirect measures to inequality of opportunity con-
struct a counterfactual income distribution that eliminates all inequality be-
tween individuals having the same effort. As such, they are measures of ex-post
inequality of opportunity, but, remember that when effort is distributed inde-
pendently of type, absence of inequality of opportunity ex-post implies equality
of opportunity ex-ante. We show that for each of the counterfactuals listed
in the previous subsection, there exists a dual counterfactual in the indirect
approach that implies ex-post equality of opportunity.
Consider first the dual counterfactuals associated with ex-ante approaches
in section 3.1. The dual counterfactual to (2) was proposed by Checchi and
Peragine (2010): they construct the counterfactual
yEO1k =
1
|N.k|
∑
i∈N.k
yi, (10)
which replaces every income by the average income of those sharing the same
efforts and compute (9), using the mean log deviation as inequality measure.
Evidently, (10) expresses the idea of utilitarian reward. It is straightforward to
provide an alternative, based on inequality averse reward, by defining the dual
to (3):
yEO2k =
1
|N.k|
∑
i∈N.k
iy˜i.
Also the duals to the parametric ex-ante approaches can be used to define
counterfactuals implying ex-post equality of opportunity: the first inspired by
(4), the second by (5):
yEO3k = ĝ
R
(
aRk , 0
)
,
yEO4k =
1
|N.k|
∑
i∈N.k
ĝ
(
aCi , a
R
i , 0
)
.
To estimate the relevant equations in both cases we need observations on aR.
The second alternative has the advantage of dealing with the correlation between
circumstances and efforts in a more flexible tranche-dependent way.
Next, consider the duals based on the counterfactuals in the direct ex-post
approach. To obtain the dual to Roemer’s direct ex-post non-parametric ap-
proach (6) and (7), fix a reference value for circumstances, aC . Next define
yEO5k
(
aC
)
=
1∣∣NaC.k ∣∣
∑
i∈NaC.k
yi,
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the average income of those that have the same responsibility vector as indi-
vidual k and have the reference value for circumstances. In the vector yEO5
everybody with the same responsibility vector has the same income, such that
there is full ex-post equality of opportunity. To eliminate the dependence of
the resulting measure of inequality of opportunity on the choice of reference
circumstances, I
(
yEO
)
in (9) can be replaced by the averaged inequality index
1
n
n∑
l=1
I
(
yEO5
(
aCl
))
.
We have not yet seen anyone suggesting this approach.
The dual to (8) is due to Bourguignon et al. (2007): fix a reference value
for the circumstance variable, aC to obtain
yEO6k
(
aC
)
= ĝ
(
aC , aRk , ek
)
. (11)
They use the Theil index as inequality measure, Pistolesi (2009) uses, in addi-
tion, the mean log deviation, the half squared coefficient of variation and the
standard deviation of logs. Also here ek can be set equal to zero or to its es-
timated value êk. The former treats it as a circumstance with reference value
zero, the latter as an effort. Most authors take the mean value for circumstances
in the sample as the reference value aC . Again this choice can be criticized for
being arbitrary. This can be overcome by replacing I
(
yEO
)
in (9) with the
averaged inequality index
1
n
n∑
l=1
I
(
yEO6
(
aCl
))
.
We are unaware of any application of such a parametric aggregate indirect
inequality of opportunity measure.
All the above approaches rely on counterfactuals ensuring ex-post equality of
opportunity and thereby entail ex-ante equality of opportunity when efforts are
distributed independently of type. But even then, however, ex-post equality of
opportunity is not necessary for ex-ante equality of opportunity. In the literature
there is only one proposal that assigns to individuals opportunity sets of equal
value, without imposing full ex-post equality of opportunity. This proposal is
the non-parametric proposal by Checchi and Peragine (2011), which evaluates
individual’s opportunity sets by (2) and constructs the counterfactual
yEO7k = yk
µ (y)
yc1k
, (12)
where µ (y) is mean income of vector y such that everybody’s income is scaled
up or down by the ratio of average income and the value of his opportunity set
as measured by (2). Observe that 1|Nk.|
∑
i∈Nk. y
EO7
i = µ (y), such that, when
opportunity sets are measured as in (2), in distribution yEO7 everybody has
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indeed an opportunity set of the same value. They use the mean log deviation as
inequality measure. Evidently, this procedure can be applied when opportunity
sets are valued differently, like, e.g., when they are valued according to (2). The
corresponding counterfactual becomes
yEO8k = yk
µ (y)
yc2k
.
3.3 Stochastic dominance
The stochastic dominance approach to the measurement of inequality of oppor-
tunity originates from the ex-ante framework.17 In our discussion in section
3.1, we have seen two non-parametric measures of the value of an opportunity
set, (2) and (3), the first being inspired by utilitarian reward, the second by in-
equality averse reward. In both cases, the value of an individual’s opportunity
set is an increasing function of the outcomes obtained by those that belong to
his type. This is an uncontroversial starting point for an ex-ante approach and
suggests that ex-ante inequality of opportunity can be established as soon as
some type’s cumulative distribution function of income first order stochastically
dominates another type’s cumulative distribution function. Hence the absence
of first order stochastic dominance between type’s cumulative distribution func-
tions can be seen as a test for ex-ante equal opportunities. Formally, let, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,mC}, Fi (y) denote the cumulative distribution function of income
of type i. A weak test of ex-ante equality of opportunity tests the following
condition.
AFOSD (Absence of First Order Stochastic Dominance): there does not exist
i, l ∈ {1, . . . ,mC}, such that, for some y ∈ R+ : Fi (y) < Fl (y) and for all
y ∈ R+ : Fi (y) ≤ Fl (y).
If one adheres to an inequality averse reward principle, one can go further.
In that case, as advocated persuasively by Lefranc et al. (2009), absence of first
order stochastic dominance can be strengthened to the requirement of absence
of second order stochastic dominance between types’ cumulative distribution
functions.
ASOSD (Absence of Second Order Stochastic Dominance): there does not exist
i, l ∈ {1, . . . ,mC}, such that, for some y ∈ R+ : ∫ y0 Fi (y˜) dy˜ < ∫ y0 Fl (y˜) dy˜ and
for all y ∈ R+ :
∫ y
0
Fi (y˜) dy˜ ≤
∫ y
0
Fl (y˜) dy˜.
3.4 Norm based measures
We know from proposition 2 that liberal reward and ex-post compensation are
incompatible. The axiomatic literature on (opportunity) fair allocations pro-
17In section 4.2.1, we will see that under a frequently made hypothesis in empirical work
(Roemer’s identification axiom) the tests developed here become also relevant from an ex-post
perspective.
17
ceeded by characterizing first best redistribution mechanisms that satisfy weak-
ened versions of the principles -see, Fleurbaey (2008) for an overview. Such
redistribution mechanisms assign to every individual, as a function of his cir-
cumstances and efforts, an income in such a way that both liberal reward and
ex-post compensation are to some extent satisfied. As shown by Devooght
(2008) and Almas et al (2011), these (partial) solutions to the liberal reward
/ ex-post compensation dilemma can be incorporated in a measure of equality
of opportunity or, in their language, a measure of offensive or unfair income
inequality, respectively. The idea is to treat the level of income that these rules
assign to a particular individual as the norm that he should get, and measure
offensive inequality by the distance between the actual income vector y and the
norm income vector yn. Formally, one computes
I (y, yn) , (13)
where the function I (·, ·) has to satisfy at least two requirements. First, since
it matters how far each individual is from his norm income, the measure must
satisfy partial symmetry (i.e. be invariant to permutations of (yk, y
n
k ) pairs),
but not full symmetry (where different permutations can be applied to the vec-
tors y and yn). Second, due to the heterogeneity of the population in terms
of compensation and responsibility characteristics, the usual transfer principle
does not apply. These arguments induce Devooght (2008) to propose Cowell’s
(1985) measure of distributional change, a special case of which is the general-
ized entropy class. Measures of distributional change have the property that a
transfer from a rich to a poor person decreases the value of the measure if and
only if the ratio of the actual income of the rich and poor person is larger than
the ratio of their norm incomes. Almas et al. (2011) define unfair treatment of
each individual as the absolute value of the difference between his actual income
and norm income and propose an unfairness Gini to aggregate these differences.
Here, a transfer from a person who is less unfairly treated to a person who is
more unfairly treated diminishes the value of the index.
Devooght takes the egalitarian equivalent allocation, first suggested in the
equality of opportunity context by Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), as the norm.
Almas et al. take in the main part of their analysis the generalized propor-
tionality allocation, first proposed by Bossert (1995), as the norm.18 As a final
remark, the computation of the norm incomes proposed by Devooght and Al-
mas requires estimation of the outcome function, ĝ
(
aCk , a
R
k , ek
)
. To compute
the norm, in both papers, the ek is replaced by its estimated value êk.
Other first-best redistribution mechanisms exist that do not require the esti-
mation of ĝ
(
aCk , a
R
k , ek
)
and can be computed non-parametrically -see, e.g., the
18They do sensitivity analysis and report results for two versions of the egalitarian equivalent
norm –which requires the choice of reference circumstances– and also for the conditional
equality norm –which requires the choice of reference efforts. In both cases, without much
argument, the reference is set equal to its average value in the sample. Their empirical results
appear insensitive to the choice of norm distribution, but it is unclear whether the choice of
the reference value matters or not.
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observable average conditional egalitarian and the observable average egalitar-
ian mechanism proposed in Bossert et al (1999). They have not yet been used
in the norm based approach and can be combined with any inequality measure
that satisfies partial symmetry and does not satisfy the usual transfer principle
(like the unfairness Gini, the generalized entropy or the divergence measures
discussed by Magdelou and Nock (2011)) to obtain valid non-parametric alter-
natives for the norm based approach.
3.5 Overview
Table 1 summarizes our survey of approaches to the measurement of inequality
of opportunity. Six observations follow from our survey.
A first observation is that we propose several new measures. New indirect
ex-post measures (yEO2, yEO3, yEO5) are generated by constructing counterfac-
tuals with complete ex-post equality on the basis of the counterfactuals used in
the direct approach. A new parametric measure of direct ex-ante (yc4) and its
dual indirect ex-post measure (yEO4) combines features of the non-parametric
approach (yc1 and yEO1, respectively) and the parametric approach (yc3 and
yEO3, respectively). We also showed how Checchi and Peragine (2010)’s indi-
rect ex-ante approach can be adjusted to deal with inequality averse reward in
yEO8. We argued that for the approaches that require the choice of a reference
value for either efforts (yc5 and yc6) or circumstances (yEO5 and yEO6) should
receive more attention. Roemer’s averaged inequality of opportunity measure
may overcome the arbitrariness of the choice of reference value to some ex-
tent. Finally, we pointed out that the norm income approach can be applied
non-parametrically by using the observable average egalitarian equivalent or the
observable average conditional egalitarian allocation mechanisms, proposed by
Bossert et al (1999).
A second observation is that many different inequality measures have been
used, often without much justification. The only exceptions are in the norm
based and in the direct measurement approach. In the former, an inequality
measure that replaces the standard transfer principle by a more suited transfer
principle and satisfies partial symmetry is necessary. In the latter, an infinite
inequality aversion was motivated from the normative point of view that all
inequalities that are due to differences in circumstances are unacceptable. We
believe that this argument is a powerful one for welfare measurement, but is
less convincing for measuring inequality of opportunity as it ignores most in-
equalities. The indirect approach is often used to answer the question to which
extent income inequality is due to inequality of opportunity. This is a mean-
ingful question for any plausible measure of income inequality, but for true
opportunity egalitarians, those concerned with equality of opportunity rather
than equality of outcome, the aswer to the question is irrelevant. Sometimes
additional arguments can be used to single out a particular measure or sets of
measures. For instance, Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Ferreira and Gig-
noux (2011) motivate the use of the mean log deviation by pointing out that it
is the only decomposable inequality measure that is path independent (Foster
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Table 1: Approaches to the measurement of inequality of opportunity
Direct and Indirect Measures
Direct Ex-Ante Indirect Ex-post
NP yc1 ∞ IA Van de gaer (1993) yEO1 MLD Peragine and Checchi (2010)
RDM Aaberge et al. (2011)
yc2 Gini Lefranc et al. (2008) yEO2
P yc3 MLD Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) yEO3
yc4 yEO4
Direct Ex-Post
NP yc5 ∞ IA Roemer (1993) yEO5
RDM Aaberge et al. (2011)
P yc6 Set1 Pistolesi (2009) yEO6 Theil Bourguignon et al. (2007)
Set1 Pistolesi (2009)
Indirect Ex-Ante
NP yEO7 MLD Peragine and Checchi (2010)
yEO8
Stochastic Dominance (Ex-ante)
First Order Second Order
NP O’Neill et al. (2001) Lefranc et al. (2008, 2009)
Lefranc et al. (2008, 2009)
Norm Based (Ex-post)
NP yn Set2 Observable average egalitarian equivalent allocation
yn Set2 Observable average conditional egalitarian allocation
P yn DC Egalitarian equivalent allocation Devooght (2008)
yn Gini Generalized proportional allocation Almas et al. (2011)
Note 1: NP=non-parametric; P=Parametric
Note 2: ∞ IA: Infinite Inequality Aversion; RDM: Rank Dependent Mean.
MLD: Mean Logarithmic Deviation; Set1: MLD, Theil, half squared
coefficient of variation and standard deviation of Log of income;
Set2: any inequality measure satisfying partial symmetry and a weak
but not strong transfer principle
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and Shneyerov, 2000), which implies that non-parametric direct and indirect
approaches yield the same results.19 Pistolesi (2009) uses for the direct mea-
surement approach a whole set of inequality measures, as his main concern is
to compare direct and indirect parametric methodologies.
A third observation is that the stochastic dominance approach is by its very
nature non-parametric. We motivated it so far from an ex-ante point of view,
but in section 4.2.1, proposition 5, we will argue that, if Roemer’s identification
axiom is assumed, rejection of the absence of first or second order stochastic
dominance implies ex-post inequality of opportunity.
A fourth observation is that norm based approaches have only been applied
using the income allocations from the axiomatic literature concerned with ex-
post inequality of opportunity as the norm distribution. The counterfactuals
used in the indirect approach can also be used as the norm income distribu-
tion. Using either yEO7 or yEO8 yields a norm based on ex-ante equality of
opportunity without requiring ex-post equality of opportunity when efforts are
distributed independently of type.
Fifth, it is important to realize that the indirect approach cannot be in-
terpreted as a norm based approach. In the norm based approach it crucially
matters who gets what, while in the indirect approach this is not the case, as
different permutations can be applied to y and yEO in (9). This makes the indi-
rect approach unattractive as a normative measure of inequality of opportunity.
It can be used to decompose income inequality into inequality that is due to cir-
cumstances and efforts, but only if a suitable inequality measure is chosen, such
that the inequality that is due to circumstances is a meaningful direct estimate
of inequality of opportunity -see the discussion following equation (3).
Finally, as especially the previous observations make clear, the theoretical
basis for many of the inequality measures that are used or can be thought of,
remains rather weak. A lot of work remains to be done to sort out the attractive
from the unattractive ones.
4 Data imperfections
In this section we confront some important problems facing the application of
the framework in the previous section: how to choose and measure circum-
stances, how to measure efforts and the consequences of imperfectly measuring
circumstances or efforts.
4.1 Circumstances
Measured inequality of opportunity crucially depends on the set of circum-
stances chosen. The larger the set of circumstances, the larger the inequality
of opportunity.20 Thus, a proper selection of the circumstances is paramount.
19From the discussion in the paragraph below equation (3), it follows that for the mean log
deviation, θI
(
y, yEO7
)
= I (y)− I (yEO7) = I (yc1) .
20Notice, thought, that if there is a negative correlation between the ’new’ circumstances,
which were previously classified as effort, and the ’old’ circumstances, which were already
21
Often researchers are limited by the scarcity of data on circumstances beyond
basic individual characteristics and family background, such that most empir-
ical studies are confined to a small set of basic circumstances. We discuss this
issue in section 4.1.2. In principle, the set of circumstances that should be in-
cluded follows from the answer to the question what should individuals be held
responsible for. This is taken up next.
4.1.1 Selection of circumstances
Three prominent views can be found in the political philosophy literature on
the difficult and unsettled question what people are responsible for.
A first view argues that individuals ought to be held responsible only for
what lies within their control –as defended, inter alia, by Arneson (1989), Co-
hen (1989), and Roemer (1993, 1998a). Control is related to the recognition
of free will, the existence of which is sometimes disputed. Those who deny the
existence of free will, such as the hard determinists, take an extreme position
and include nearly all observables in the circumstance set and consider almost
all inequalities as unfair. Most empirical studies, however, adopt a possibilist
criterion, which is consistent with the existence of free will, and classifies as
circumstance family background variables, such as parental education or occu-
pation, individual characteristics, such as gender, ethnicity or age, and innate
characteristics, such as IQ. Under this view, contextual variables such as ac-
cess to basic services, e.g. clean water, sanitation, electricity or transportation,
should also be included in the circumstance set.
A second approach contends that individuals ought to be held responsible for
their preferences and the ensuing choices –as advocated, intera alia, by Rawls
(1971), Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), Van Parijs (1995) and Fleurbaey (2008). Un-
der this view, the set of circumstances gets reduced to a minimal set of variables
including innate characteristics or traits such as talent or beauty.21 In contrast,
variables such as gender or ethnicity, which are typically classified as circum-
stances in empirical analyses, should belong to the realm of responsibility if the
differential effect they bring about reflects exclusively differences in preferences,
i.e. are not the result of discriminatory treatment.22
included in the set, opportunity inequality may decrease, and not increase (Cappelen and
Tungodden, 2006).
21Since Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) we know that physically attractive workers obtain
sizable rents from their looks. More recently, Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) identified three
transmission channels for such beauty premium.
22As Fleurbaey (2008) persuasively explains, under the believe that free will exists, the
control approach comes very close to the preference approach to responsibility, as genuine
control is “typically defined in terms of choices reflecting authentic preferences” (p. 250).
In addition, the preference approach may be extended to hold people responsible for any
preference or characteristic which they endorse, i.e. which they would have chosen were they
in control. Notwithstanding all this, he goes on to argue, the two approaches may yield
substantively different conclusions when advantage results from preferences, which have not
been chosen in any sense and are not endorsed by the individual. Since control, choice and
endorsement are very hard to observe, it is very difficult to test empirically whether the control
and the preference approach are close or far from each other.
22
In line with Nozick (1974)’s self-ownership argument,23 a third view consid-
ers that individuals are entitled to the products of all personal characteristics,
including genetic ones such as innate talent. This leads to the other extreme po-
sition where the set of circumstances is empty, and all inequalities are legitimate.
There is no room for equality of opportunity in this view.
4.1.2 Unobserved circumstances
As soon as we agree that there are circumstances for which people should be
compensated, we enter the realm of equality of opportunity and need to measure
these circumstances: application of equal opportunity theories without observ-
ing any circumstances is impossible. In practice, measuring circumstances is
easier than measuring efforts and different datasets can be combined to obtain
a more comprehensive set of circumstances, as in Ferreira et al (2011). Even
then an exhaustive list of circumstances is typically not available, however. As-
sume that we have directly observed the relevant efforts, but did not observe all
relevant circumstances. In that case, the partitioning of the population in true
types is a finer partitioning than the one on the basis of observed types and the
outcomes of the observed types is a weighted average of outcomes conditioned
on true types with weights determined by the population frequency of the true
types in the observed types. This leads to a downward bias in ex-post inequality
of opportunity, as the inequality within the columns based on observed types
is smaller than in the columns based on the true types. Similarly, as the rows
associated with the observed types are weighted averages of the rows associated
with the true types, unobserved circumstances lead to an underestimation of
ex-ante inequality of opportunity. Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) in particular
stress that estimates of inequality of opportunity based on an incomplete list
of circummstances should be interpreted as a lower bound of true inequality of
opportunity.
4.1.3 Contribution of different circumstances to inequality of oppor-
tunity
Consider the indirect measurement approach (see section 3.2), which determines
the amount of income inequality that remains when there is no inequality of
opportunity left. The Bourguignon et al. (2007) approach determines this
counterfactual income distribution as the one that results when everyone has
the same reference circumstances -see (11). By not equalising all circumstances
at once Bourguignon et al. (2007), show that it is possible to estimate the
partial effect of one (or a set) of circumstance variables J , controlling for the
others (j 6= J). Following their specification of the function g (aCk , aRk , ek), let
ln yk = β
CaCk + β
RaRk + uk,
23The self-ownership argument states that individuals own themselves and thus have a
legitimate claim over the products of their talents and abilities.
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and construct alternative counterfactual distributions
y
EO(J)
k = exp
[
β̂JaCJk + β̂
j 6=JaCj 6=Jk + β̂Ra
R
k + êk
]
,
where aCJk is the vector of reference values of the circumstances in set J and
aCj 6=Jk the vector of actual circumstances of individual k of the circumstances in
the complement of the set J . This allows to compute inequality of opportunity
due to a given (set of) circumstance(s), J in spirit of the indirect ex-ante para-
metric approach by replacing yEO in (9) by yEO(J) defined above. To compute
each circumstance’s contribution to overall inequality one can use the Shapley
decomposition (Shorrocks, 1999), which avoids the path dependency problem
whereby results are sensitive to the ordering in which circumstances are put at
their reference value in the analysis. This approach has become quite popular
recently (see, e.g. Bjo¨rklund et al. (2011)). Usually, the mean value of the
circumstance characteristic is taken as the reference value.
4.2 Constructing measures of effort
To apply ex-post compensation, we need to identify individuals’ efforts in a nor-
matively attractive way. Effort variables are shaped by circumstances. Prefer-
ences and tastes, for instance, are partly shaped by family background. Whether
we should correct for this is closely related to the answer to the question what
people are responsible for (see subsection 4.1.1). Those defending responsibility
for preferences (and the resulting choices) will typically argue that it does not
matter where these preferences come from, as long as people identify with them.
Those defending responsibility by control (like Roemer (1993, 1998a and 1998b)
argue that, as people do not control their circumstances, raw effort variables
should be cleaned to obtain normatively relevant efforts. This view is dominant
in most empirical applications to date. We discuss four different procedures
used in the literature to construct normatively relevant effort(s).
4.2.1 Unobservable effort, non-parametric identification
If no effort variables are observed, the lack of data can only be overcome with
some auxiliary hypotheses. The most elegant and frequently used comes from
John Roemer (1993), and is stated as follows.
RIA (Roemer’s Identification Assumption): those that are at the same per-
centile of the distribution of income conditional on their type have exercised the
same degree of effort.
This assumption allows us to take the percentile within the income distri-
bution of an individual’s type as the normatively relevant measure of his effort.
By construction effort is distributed uniformly over [0, 1] for all types and con-
sequently independently distributed of type.
RIA can be derived from more fundamental hypothesis about the income
generating process and the distribution of circumstances and effort. More in
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particular, as pointed out by Fleurbaey (1998, p.221), RIA assumes that (A1)
the multi-dimensional effort variables aRi can be aggregated into a scalar measure
of responsibility ari in such a way that with every value for a
R
i corresponds
exactly one value for ari and that income is a strictly increasing function of a
r
i
and (A2) ari is distributed independently of a
C
i . As argued by Roemer, while
(A2) is, within the responsibility by control view, a natural assumption for
normatively relevant effort, assumption (A1) is very strong.
The assumption is very powerful, for, thanks to RIA, the equality of opportu-
nity framework becomes operational even when effort is unobservable: one only
needs to compute the cumulative distribution of incomes conditional on types,
and equate the percentile corresponding to each individual’s income within the
cumulative distribution of his type to his level of effort. This allows the con-
struction of a new matrix Y˜ R, to which one can apply all the ideas mentioned
in section 2 and all the non-parametric procedures from table 1. Observe that,
by construction, all elements in the same row of Y˜ R contain the same number
of individuals.
The plot of the inverse of the cumulative income distributions conditional on
types gives for each percentile the corresponding income level. If the plots for
two types differ at some percentile, we have ex-post inequality of opportunity:
for the same degree of responsibility, two individuals of different types receive
a different level of income. Fixing the percentile value and reading the corre-
sponding income values for all types is like looking at a particular column in the
matrix Y of the previous section; it amounts to taking an ex-post perspective.
Alternatively, looking at the cumulative distribution function for each type is
very much like looking at a row in the matrix Y , with a continuous effort vari-
able. Hence the cumulative distribution function also provides the information
necessary for an ex-ante perspective.
The above insights provide the basis for analyzing conditional distribution
functions from a perspective of equality of opportunity. At the one hand, with
unobservable effort (and RIA), ex-post equality of opportunity is satisfied if and
only if the following property holds true.
ECDF (Equal Cumulative Distribution Functions): for all i, l ∈ {1, . . . ,mC}
and for all y ∈ R+ : Fi (y) = Fl (y).
At the other hand, ex-ante equality of opportunity directly leads to the
requirement of the absence of first order stochastic dominance between types’
cumulative distribution functions, i.e. condition AFOSD in section 3.3. We
now have recovered the result that since effort is distributed independently
of type, full equality of ex-post opportunities implies full equality of ex-ante
opportunities, stated in the first paragraph of section 3.
Proposition 5: Accepting RIA, ex-post equality of opportunity implies ex-ante
equality of opportunity.
When RIA is imposed, testing whether (AFOSD) can be rejected can thus be
interpreted as a weak test of ex-post equality of opportunity (ECDF).
25
Finally, suppose that we apply RIA and use the percentile within type as a
measure of effort to construct the matrix Ŷ , but we only condition the cumula-
tive distribution functions on the vector of observable circumstances aCO, not on
the entire vector of circumstances aC =
[
aCO, aCU
]
, where aCU are unobserved
circumstances. Strong assumptions are necessary to relate the results obtained
on the basis of the constructed matrix Ŷ to the true matrix Y . To see this,
consider the simple case where aCO and aCU are one-dimensional. Moreover,
assume that aCU is either aCU or aCU . In that case,
F
(
y | aCOi
)
= F
(
y | aCOi , aCU
)
pi
(
aCU
)
+ F
(
y | aCOi , aCU
)
pi
(
aCU
)
,
where pi
(
aCU
)
and pi
(
aCU
)
are the fraction of the observations with aCO =
aCOi that have a
CU = aCU and aCU , respectively. The cumulative distribu-
tion function F
(
y | aCOi
)
serves as the basis to identify effort for observable
type aCOi , and is a weighted average of the cumulative distribution functions of
true types, F
(
y | aCOi , aCU
)
and F
(
y | aCOi , aCU
)
. The only case in which the
percentile of F
(
y | aCOi
)
provides correct information on the percentiles of the
true types is when F
(
y | aCOi , aCU
)
= F
(
y | aCOi , aCU
)
, meaning that, after
conditioning on observed circumstances, the unobserved circumstance does not
affect outcomes. In all other cases, effort will be wrongly identified and, the
larger the effect of the omitted circumstance on the true conditional cumulative
distribution functions, the less representative identified effort is for true effort.
We summarize this point in the following proposition.
Proposition 6: Accepting RIA, omitted circumstances induce wrong iden-
tification of effort unless the unobserved circumstances, after conditioning on
observed circumstances, no longer affect income.
4.2.2 Unobservable effort, parametric identification
The non-parametric methodology of the previous subsection allows to identify
each individual’s (normatively relevant) effort as the percentile within the in-
come distribution of his type. Clearly, this approximation works well only if
every type contains a substantial number of individuals. If not, a parametric
methodology can be a better alternative.
With unobservable effort, Bjo¨rklund et al. (2011) allow the distribution of
effort conditional on type to have different variances, as initially suggested by
Roemer (1998a). They assume that effort has two components: a type specific
component, ηik, whose variance (σ
2
i ) differs across types i and which captures the
part of effort that is correlated with circumstances, and a second component,
ωk, with a homogeneous variance, σ
2. The latter is defined as a standardization
of the former, ωk = η
i
k/(σ
2
i /σ
2), so that the income generating process can be
written as:
ln yk = β
CaCk + η
i
k = β
CaCk + η˜
i
k + ωk, (14)
where η˜ik =
(
ηik − ωk
)
measures the influence of circumstances on the conditional
variation of the outcome around the expected value for each type, i. The term
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η˜ik, then, captures the indirect effect of circumstances, while ωk is assumed to
capture ‘pure’ effort.
Notice that the econometric error terms are lumped together with efforts,
implying that everything that traditionally enters the error term (specification
error, omitted variable bias) determines measured effort. Roemer’s approach is
non-parametric, such that it does not suffer from specification errors (unless the
assumed one-dimensionality of effort is considered to be a specification error),
but omitted variable bias (circumstances) is also for the Roemer approach an
issue (see proposition 6).
4.2.3 Unobservable effort, panel data and parametric identification
Consider the case where no efforts are observed, but the researcher has access to
panel data. In this case, Salvi (2007) shows that detailed modeling of the income
generating process can be helpful. She exploits the longitudinal features of panel
data to distinguish between time-varying and time-invariant circumstances and
efforts. Efforts are assumed unobservable and divided into individual traits that
do not change over time (aRk ), such as skills, preferences, aspirations or individ-
ual talents, and the exertion of effort, which is time-varying (aRkt). Individual
traits, aRk , are modeled as unobservable time-invariant individual effects, while
the exertion of effort, aRkt, cannot be distinguished from the idiosyncratic error
term, υkt. Circumstance variables are also broken down into time-varying (a
C
kt)
and time-invariant (aCk ), and are assumed observable. Thus, the income variable
is modeled as:
error term, εit (15)
ln ykt = α1a
C
kt︸ ︷︷ ︸+α2aCk︸ ︷︷ ︸+ aRk︸︷︷︸+ ︷ ︸︸ ︷aRkt︸︷︷︸ + υkt︸︷︷︸ .
t-v circ. t-inv circ. ind. traits exertion brute luck+white noise
Individual traits, aRk , are allowed to be correlated with circumstances, i.e. cir-
cumstances may affect the individual preferences and aspirations but not her
level of effort exertion, which is supposed to be orthogonal to circumstances.
Using the estimates
(
α̂1, α̂2, â
R
k , ε̂kt
)
of equation (15), Salvi proceeds to com-
pute a counterfactual distribution similar to (11) by setting (all) circumstances
at the sample mean value aCkt and a
C
k :
yEOkt = exp
[
α̂1a
C
kt + α2a
C
k + â
R
k + ε̂kt
]
.
She estimates inequality of opportunity by means of (9); her approach is indirect
ex-post parametric. Notice that, as in Bjo¨rklund et al. (2011), the econometric
error terms are also lumped together with efforts.
4.2.4 Observable effort correlated with circumstances
A final case considered in the literature occurs when we observe (all) effort vari-
ables, but they are correlated with circumstances. Roemer (1993 and 1998b)
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gives the example of peoples’ occupation (circumstance) which affects both the
number of cigarettes smoked (observable effort) and health (outcome). As white
collar workers smoke on average less than blue collar workers, we cannot equate
the number of cigarettes smoked to normatively relevant effort because that
would implicitly hold workers responsible for their circumstance (occupation).
Hence, to obtain normatively relevant effort, we have to clean the number of
cigarettes smoked from the impact of occupation. Roemer suggests the tech-
nique described in section 4.2.1, to determine an individual’s responsibility as his
percentile in his type’s distribution of number of cigarettes smoked. There exist
evident alternatives. As proposed by Schokkaert el al. (2004) and Bourguignon
et al. (2007), a variety of econometric techniques, like regression analysis, can
be used to obtain cleaned normatively relevant effort variables. The norma-
tively relevant effort level then becomes the disturbance term in a regression of
occupation on number of cigarettes smoked.
Bourguignon et al. (2007), develop this idea and model earnings, yk, as
function of effort
(
aRk
)
and circumstance
(
aCk
)
variables,
ln yk = β
CaCk + β
RaRk + uk, (16)
and let endogenous effort depend on circumstances:
aRk = Ha
C
k + vk, (17)
where βC and βR are parameter vectors, H is a matrix of parameters relating
circumstances and efforts, and v and u denote pure random factors. Equation
(17) allows correlation between aCk and a
R
k , and models the indirect effect of cir-
cumstances on the outcome through their influence on efforts. This allows the
estimation of direct and indirect effects of circumstances on earnings. The coun-
terfactual distribution yEODT , which includes both direct and indirect effect of
circumstances, may be obtained by using the parameter estimates
(
β̂C , β̂R, Ĥ
)
and setting the vector of circumstances at the sample mean aC in both equations
(16) and (17). To do so we can estimate a reduced form of (16) and (17):
ln yak = ψa
C
k + εk, (18)
where ψ =
[
βC + βRH
]
and εk = β
Rvk + uk resulting in estimates
(
ψ̂, ε̂k
)
and
put
yEODTk = exp
[
ψ̂aC + ε̂k
]
.
An estimate of the counterfactual distribution where only the direct effects
of circumstances are equalized, yEOD, may also be obtained by estimating (16)
and computing
yEODk = exp
[
β̂CaC + β̂RaRk + ûk
]
. (19)
Inequality of opportunity indices are then obtained by comparing actual inequal-
ity I (y) to the inequality in the simulated earnings distributions, I
(
yEODT
)
, i.e.
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by computing (9), with an appropriate measure of inequality. The importance
of direct and indirect effects can be computed by means of the (simulated) dis-
tribution of earnings yEOD, where circumstances are equal for the direct effect
only.
Using econometric techniques has the advantage that it allows the researcher
to take more than one effort variable into account; contrary to Roemer’s ap-
proach effort can be truly multi-dimensional. As compared to Roemer’s non-
parametric methodology, the methodology in this subsection relies on functional
form assumptions to obtain inequality of opportunity estimates (but see Pistolesi
(2009), discussed in section 5.2, for a semi parametric density estimation tech-
nique to obtain the relevant counterfactual distributions). Three reasons may
justify such cost. First, controlling for circumstances in a multivariate regres-
sion framework uses data more efficiently, and allows for finer categories. As
the vector of observed circumstances becomes larger (and the number of cat-
egories within each variable increases) the number of types and tranches grow
exponentially, which leads to type-tranche combinations with very few (possibly
zero) observations, such that sampling variances are very large, and estimates
become unreliably imprecise24. Second, the above problem is even more se-
vere when (some) circumstances are continuous variables. Clearly, there exist
non-parametric techniques like kernel density estimation that have already been
used and allow one to deal with continuous circumstances (see section 5.3), but
these techniques require large data sets to yield reliable estimates. As a result,
in case one only has small datasets, parametric approaches become an attractive
alternative. Third, as explained in section 4.1.3, the parametric methodology
permits the estimation of the partial effect of one (or a set) of the circumstance
variables J , controlling for the others (j 6= J), such that we can compute in-
equality of opportunity due to a given (set of) circumstance(s), J . However, also
in this approach, the econometric error terms are lumped together with efforts,
implying that everything that traditionally enters the error term (specification
error, omitted variable bias) determines measured effort. In the next section,
we reflect on how to deal with error terms.
4.3 Luck and error terms
In section 3 we introduced omitted variables uk and random variables ek in
the analysis. In practice, uk captures the effects of omitted circumstances and
efforts, while specification errors heavily affect ek. Given the diversity of the
samples and econometric techniques used, it becomes difficult in general to
say much about the importance of error terms. Nevertheless, the following
observations can be made.
Due to data limitations most empirical studies include a limited set of cir-
cumstances in their list. Virtually all studies include a measure of social back-
ground luck (parental income, parental education). Very few surveys have ob-
24In such cases, the proposal made in Donni et al. (2012), to use a latent class technique
that endogenously determines the types (and number of types) provides a way out for non-
parametric methodologies.
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servations on genetic luck. An exception is Bjo¨rklund et al. (2011): they find
IQ, even though measured at the age of 18 considered to be a prominent ex-
ponent of genetic luck, to be the most influential factor behind inequality of
opportunity in Sweden. This suggests that, if genetic luck is not included in the
list of circumstances, genetic luck can be an important contributor to the error
term. We are unaware of forms of brute luck or option luck being included in
the list of circumstances such that they always enter the error terms. As it is
usually claimed (see section 2.3) that genetic luck should be fully compensated,
some compensation is due for brute luck, and we cannot know what part of the
error term should be included as a circumstance, the argument seems to call for
some compensation for the effects of luck such that the principle of utilitarian
reward (using a full list of circumstances) has to be replaced by inequality averse
reward (since one is typically using only a limited list of circumstances).
5 Empirical applications
In the light of the discussions in sections 3 and 4, this section reviews a selected
sample of studies that apply the concepts and techniques explained in these two
previous sections. Our emphasis is not on the results obtained per se but in
the methodological choices taken and their bearing on inequality of opportunity
comparisons.
5.1 Direct measures
Cogneau and Mesple´-Somps (2008) compute (1), to compare ex-ante and ex-
post inequality of opportunity in five African countries. The outcome variable is
household consumption per head and circumstances are based on fathers’ social
origins (farmers, non farmers with at most primary education and non farmers
with more than primary education) and region of birth. They measure ex-
post inequality, identifying effort assuming RIA and using the minimum income
relative to the mean as inequality index in (7). This is the inequality index
following from Roemer’s work. Ex-ante individuals’ opportunity sets are valued
by average type income (2) and ex-ante inequality is measured by the lowest
average type income divided by mean income in the country, which corresponds
to the proposal by Van de gaer (1993). As the cumulative distribution functions
of different types do not cross, they find that the inequality of opportunity
ranking for the five countries does not depend on which of both measures is
taken 25. Taking only fathers’ social origins as circumstances, inequality of
opportunity is largest in Madagascar, followed by Ghana in 98, Guinea, Uganda,
Ivory Coast and Ghana in 88.
25This is a well known property of these specific measures. As the cumulative distribution
functions do not cross, for a given percentile (level of effort), it will always be the same type
that has the lowest income. But then, the average over these lowest incomes has to coincide
with the average value of the opportunity set of the worst-off type.
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Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2008) provide a direct measurement of ex-
ante income inequality by computing the Gini opportunity index for (1) with
(3) measuring the value of each individual’s opportunity set. They compare
nine Western countries from the perspective of opportunity equality by com-
paring the distributions of the pre-tax as well as the net disposable income in
these countries for male-headed households aged 25-40, conditional on social
background, measured by 3 levels of father’s education (professional group for
France and Great Britain). Italy has the highest inequality of opportunity,
followed by the U.S., Belgium, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Sweden and West Germany. The value of the Gini opportunity inequality
index is shown to be decomposable in a return (differences in the means of
the conditional distribution) and a risk component (differences in the spread of
the conditional distributions). In countries with the lowest value of opportunity
inequality, the risk contribution is negative, meaning that inequality of risk mit-
igates inequality of opportunity: those coming from disadvantaged backgrounds
have less risky lotteries than those coming from advantaged backgrounds. In
countries with a high inequality of opportunity, risk exacerbates inequality of
opportunity. Finally, using the value for their Gini opportunity index, the au-
thors notice that there is a positive correlation (0.67) between inequality of
opportunity and inequality of outcomes (measured by the standard Gini coeffi-
cient), and that there is no trade-off in the sample between per-capita income
and equality of opportunity.
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) are the only ones that employ the direct ex-
ante parametric approach based on (4). They compute direct inequality of
opportunity for household income per capita in six Latin American countries,
using father’s and mother’s education, father’s occupation, ethnicity and region
of birth as circumstances. Ranking inequality of opportunity from high to low,
Brazil is followed by Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Ecuador and Columbia. They
do the same analysis using the direct non-parametric ex-ante measure based on
(2), and find very similar results.
5.2 Indirect measures
Checchi and Peragine (2010) compute ex-ante and ex-post inequality of opportu-
nity in Italy using a non-parametric methodology for the indirect approach (9).
They apply this framework to gross annual earnings, take family background
(measured by highest educational attainment of the parents) as the circum-
stance variable and compare inequality of opportunity of different subgroups in
the population that share similar degrees of labor market conditions and female
labor market participation (compare men versus women and Northern versus
Central and Southern Italy). In the ex-ante approach average type income (2)
measures the value of the opportunity set; the counterfactual is given by (12).
In the ex-post approach, effort is identified assuming RIA and inequality of op-
portunity is thus measured as the difference between the inequality in the actual
distribution of income and the inequality in a counterfactual distribution, where
individuals are assigned the mean income of their tranche as in (10). The mean
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log deviation is used as inequality index. Ex-ante inequality of opportunity ac-
counts for about 15 % of total income inequality whereas ex-post inequality of
opportunity accounts for 20 %. They also find that inequality of opportunity is
highest among women in southern Italy.
Bjo¨rklund et al. (2011) use the parametric approach outlined in section 4.2.2
to estimate ex-ante inequality of opportunity for total pre-tax income in Sweden
indirectly and put together the most comprehensive set of circumstances seen
so far by employing information from four different datasets for Sweden, which
combine survey and register information. In particular, they have information
on parental long-run income, parental education, family structure, own IQ and
own body mass index, which allows them to split the sample into 1152 types.
They estimate the empirical type-specific variances from the OLS residuals of
(14). With this large set of circumstances, they find that effort still accounts
for 70 percent of income inequality in Sweden. Amongst the circumstances, IQ
is the most influential variable, followed by the indirect effect of circumstances
as measured by the heterogeneous type-specific variances and parental income.
Salvi (2007) uses the panel data structure outlined in section 4.2.3 to iden-
tify effort estimating (16) and computes ex-post inequality of opportunity in
Nepal for 1995 and 2003. Unlike other empirical applications, she uses local
infrastructure variables (presence of bus service and electric power in the vil-
lage, and number of secondary schools) as circumstances and finds that family
background has a small effect while infrastructure and ethnicity have a large
effect. Rather surprisingly, when the MLD (instead of the Theil index) is used
to compute (9) estimates are negative. That is, consumption inequality is larger
when circumstances are equalized than when they are not, and thus equalizing
circumstances would increase consumption inequality.
Bourguignon et al. (2007) developed a model to deal with the situation
where efforts are correlated with circumstances –see section 4.2.4– and compute
ex-post inequality of opportunity indirectly, using (11) and (9). They use data
from urban male hourly earnings in Brazil to quantify the effect on earnings of
five circumstances (father’s and mother’s education, father’s occupation, race,
and region of birth). The indirect effect of circumstances works through three
effort variables (own education, migration out of hometown, and labor market
status).26 Their results show that, first, the group of five circumstances accounts
for about a quarter of total earnings inequality. The direct effect explains 60%
of the reduction in inequality when circumstances are equalized, the remaining
40% is due to the indirect effect. Second, family background is by far the most
important circumstance determining a person’s opportunities.
Pistolesi (2009) uses a semi-parametric density estimation approach to per-
form an analysis similar to that by Bourguignon et al. (2007), where direct
and indirect effects of circumstances are separated out. He analyses the evolu-
tion of opportunity inequality in the U.S. between 1968 and 2001, using PSID
data. The income variable is averaged earnings (over 5 years), circumstances
26Labor market status: indicates whether the worker is a formal employee, an employer, an
informal employee or self-employed.
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are age, years of education of both parents, father’s occupation, ethnicity and
region of birth. Effort is measured by the variation in schooling attainment and
annual working hours unaccounted for by circumstances. Apart from the semi-
parametric methodology, which makes it possible for explanatory variables to
have different effects at different points in the distribution, this paper makes an-
other important contribution. He computes independently both inequality due
to effort (i.e. when circumstances have been equalized) and inequality due to
circumstances (i.e. where effort has been equalized at the mean of the estimated
conditional distribution of effort). The former allows him to compute (11) and
(9), the latter (8) and (1). He finds that the direct and indirect ex-post ap-
proaches provide very similar estimates of inequality of opportunity27. Finally,
it is noteworthy that the econometric modeling shows that circumstances have
a major impact on human capital accumulation decisions, but their impact on
labor supply decisions is limited.
5.3 Stochastic dominance
An application of the use of stochastic dominance is Lefranc, Pistolesi and Tran-
noy (2008), who compare nine Western countries from the perspective of oppor-
tunity equality by comparing the pre-tax and net disposable household income
distributions in these countries for male-headed households aged 25-40, condi-
tional on social background (see also the second paragraph of section 5.1). They
compare pairwise the cumulative conditional distributions within each country
by means of first and second order stochastic dominance and are the first to
use rigorous statistical test for stochastic dominance, using the non-parametric
stochastic dominance tests developed by Davidson and Duclos (2000). Sweden
is the only country for which equality of the conditional cumulative distribution
functions cannot be rejected. Then comes West Germany, followed by a group
of 3 countries consisting out of Great Britain, Belgium and Norway. In France,
Italy, the Netherlands and the U.S., they find second order stochastic dominance
relations between all conditional cumulative distribution functions, indicating
unequal opportunities between all social background groups. Observe that the
stochastic dominance ordering of countries deviates somewhat from the ordering
obtained from computation of the Gini opportunity index discussed in section
5.1.
Things are only slightly trickier when (some) circumstances are continuous
variables. In this case, one can estimate the conditional distribution using den-
sity estimation techniques. O’Neill et al (2000) propose to use a Kernel density
estimator to estimate the distribution of income conditional on parental income
and use this procedure to depict the incomes of children, conditional on the
income percentile of their parents in the US, i.e. the opportunity set of a child
whose parent was at a particular percentile in the income distribution of his
generation. Individuals whose parents are at the 25th percentile of the income
27This holds true for the Theil index, the Gini index, the mean log deviation and the
standard deviation of logs. For the half squared coefficient of variation differences are more
pronounced.
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distribution have to be ranked 70-th (out of 100) to obtain average labor in-
come, while the ranking is only 40-th when parents are at the 75th percentile.
The income gap between individuals at the 50-th percentile with parents at the
25-th and 75-the percentile is 56 %. One limitation of this procedure is that it
takes only one circumstance variable into account. Nilsson (2005) mends this
by using a semi-parametric approach, in which all conditioning variables other
than parental income (such as stability of parental relationship, whether the
parents were foreign born, characteristic of the parish where the family lived)
enter linearly in the children’s’ labor income generating equation. The resulting
opportunity sets can then be drawn conditional on parental income and a spe-
cific value for the other circumstances. In his empirical application to Sweden,
he finds that male individuals whose parents are at the 25th percentile of the
income distribution have to be ranked 52.3 (out of 100) to obtain average labor
income, while the ranking is only 42.6 when parents are at the 75th percentile.
The income gap between two individuals at the 50th percentiles of their condi-
tional distributions is nearly 10%. Compared to the results from O’Neill et al,
the differences in opportunities seem to be smaller in Sweden than in the US.
5.4 Norm based measures
Devooght (2008) computes norm based inequality of opportunity taking the
egalitarian equivalent solution as the norm and Cowell’s measures of distribu-
tional change as inequality index. He uses households’ pre-tax labor income
in a sample of Belgian individuals in 1998. Income is estimated by means of
specification (16), and the least favorable value of each circumstance character-
istic is taken as reference value in the computation of the egalitarian equivalent
norm. The author experiments with different sets of circumstances and differ-
ent values for the reference level of circumstance characteristics. He concludes
that, depending on the choices made in these respects “responsibility-sensitive
inequality measurement considers about 90-97.5% of traditionally measured in-
come inequality as offensive” (p. 290), which is much larger than the inequality
of opportunity found with non-norm based approaches.
Almas et al. (2011) compute norm based inequality of opportunity taking
the generalized proportionality principle as the norm and a Gini index defined
over deviations from the norm as inequality index. The empirical application
is based on a large sample of Norwegian citizens. Households’ annual labor
earnings are estimated as a function of effort and circumstance characteristics,
the specification is again of the form (16), and a model enables the imputation
of post-tax incomes. They experiment with different sets of circumstance and
effort variables. For post tax incomes, when the set of responsibility variables
is empty the unfairness Gini (which coincides with the standard Gini) equals
0.205. As the set of responsibility characteristics is extended (to include, suc-
cessively hours worked, years of education, working in the public sector, county
of residence, field of education and age), the unfairness Gini drops (though
not monotonically) to 0.152, which means that even with this extensive set of
responsibility variables, unfair inequality is about 75 % of total inequality. In
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addition, they find that, while the standard Gini index of inequality (which takes
complete equality as the norm distribution) was lower in 2005 than in 1986, the
unfairness Gini index has increased, irrespective of the sets of circumstance and
responsibility variables used.
Both Devooght (2008) and Almas et al (2011) treat the error terms as a
compensation variable, but acknowledge that the error term might contain un-
observed effort variables, and so the choice to treat them as compensation vari-
ables can be questioned.28 In another paper, Almas (2008) experiments with the
role of the error terms from the estimated equation, treating it as a circumstance
variable (leading to an upper bound of unfairness) or as a responsibility variable
(leading to a lower bound of unfairness) in the computation of the norm. From a
comparison of the US and Germany, using data on pre- and post-tax incomes in
the year 2000 they find that for the upper bound of unfairness, Germany is con-
sidered to be less unfair than the US whenever the set of compensation variables
is not empty, but for the lower bound, the US is less unfair than Germany.
6 Conclusion
We have seen that inequality of opportunity theories attempt to combine a com-
pensation principle with a reward principle. Compensation can be done from
an ex-ante or an ex-post perspective. Proposition 1 shows that the two are in-
compatible. The two most common reward principles are utilitarian reward and
liberal reward. Proposition 2 shows that the former is incompatible with ex-post
compensation and proposition 3 shows that the latter is also incompatible with
ex-post compensation. We proposed a third reward principle, inequality-averse
reward which can be motivated if, after listing observed circumstances, there
remain factors for which compensation is due, like unobserved circumstances
or arbitrary property rights or if randomness of incomes within each type lead
to the use of a risk-averse evaluation of the possible incomes. Proposition 4
shows that also this reward principle is incompatible with ex-post compensa-
tion. As a result, when measuring inequality of opportunity, important choices
have to be made: is the perspective ex-ante or ex-post compensation and what
kind of reward principle should be used: utilitarian reward, liberal reward or an
inequality-averse reward principle.
Empirical approaches fall into 3 categories. A first approach computes (dif-
ferences in) standard inequality measures. Direct measures calculate the in-
equality in a counterfactual distribution where all inequalities due to differences
in efforts have been eliminated. Indirect measures look at the difference between
inequality in the actual income distribution and inequality in a counterfactual
without inequality of opportunity. We stressed the duality between the counter-
factuals used in both approaches and used it to formulate new indirect measures
of inequality of opportunity. Moreover, all indirect measures except one use a
28The contrast with the unobservable effort approach is striking, since there the error term
is de facto treated as an effort variable.
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counterfactual of ex-post equality of opportunity, which implies ex-ante equal-
ity of opportunity if effort is distributed independently of type. The second
approach looks for stochastic dominance between the cumulative distribution
functions of different types. This approach is easiest to motivate from an ex-
ante perspective, but if Roemer’s Identification Axiom is accepted, existence of
stochastic dominance also implies ex-post inequality of opportunity. A third
approach relies on the difference between the actual income vector and a norm
income vector that (imperfectly) incorporates liberal reward and ex-post com-
pensation. The applications in the literature rely on parametric estimation of
the income function to compute the norm, but we pointed out that there exist
non-parametric alternatives such as the observable average egalitarian equiva-
lent and observable average conditional egalitarian mechanisms. In addition,
one can consider all the equality of opportunity counterfactuals used in the
indirect measurement approach as possible norm income vectors. This is a
natural approach, which raises questions about the use of indirect measures of
inequality of opportunity. We feel that indirect measures should be considered
as an instrument to decompose income inequality into inequality that is due
to circumstances at the one hand and and efforts at the other hand, but this
question is of secondary importance only, as our main concern is with inequality
of opportunity itself, not with inequality of incomes, which is the concern in the
decomposition exercise. To measure inequality of opportunity, the direct mea-
sures and the norm based approach are more suited. The indirect measurement
and the norm based approaches as they have been used so far often rely on
econometric techniques to determine the counterfactual or norm income distri-
bution, and therefore error terms due to random error and missing covariates
enter the picture. If the error terms are purely random, they should probably be
treated as a compensation variable, as it is unacceptable to hold people account-
able for brute luck. However, when there are missing covariates things become
more blurred, as the effect of the missing covariates is partly taken over by the
present covariates, and the remainder creeps in the error term. The error term
then contains random error, part of missing circumstances and part of missing
effort variables, in proportions that are unknown.
Although there are only few studies comparing the performance of differ-
ent approaches and methods, some tentative conclusions may be drawn from
the reviewed empirical literature. First, taking an ex-ante or an ex-post per-
spective is an important choice which can affect the results, as in Checchi and
Peragine (2010). Aaberge et al. (2011), however, find similar results when using
ex-ante and ex-post approaches, which suggests that whether both approaches
yield similar results or not might depend on the samples used or the exact way
of measuring the corresponding inequalities. Second, computing inequality of
opportunity as the difference between inequality in the actual distribution of
income and inequality in a counterfactual distribution where circumstances are
equalized, as defined in (9), or as the inequality in a counterfactual distribu-
tion where there are no differences in effort, as defined in (1), yield similar
results (Pistolesi (2009), Ferreira and Gignoux (2011)). Third, norm based ap-
proaches yield substantially different results than non-normed based methods
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as the share of unfair inequality is much higher than in the non-norm based
approaches. Fourth, while it can be insightful to model the direct and indirect
effects of circumstances (as the latter are found to account for a substantial part
of overall opportunity inequality by Bourguignon et al. (2007) and Bjo¨rklund
et al.(2011)), if all one wants to do is assessing the extent of inequality of op-
portunity from a responsibility as control approach, such that both direct and
indirect effects of circumstances should be taken into account, a reduced form
estimate, regressing only circumstances on incomes, is enough. Fifth, when
taking a parametric approach, treating error terms as circumstance or as effort
may make a whole difference, as Almas (2008) shows. Hence, the robustness of
the results with respect to this choice should always be checked. Sixth, there is
little consensus about the most important circumstance variable: different cir-
cumstances account for the largest share of income or consumption inequality
in regions with different economic conditions and degree of economic develop-
ment. Bjo¨rklund et al. (2011), using the largest set of circumstances of all
studies to date, find IQ to be the most influential circumstance for Sweden.
Bourguignon et al. (2007), however, find parental education to be the most
influential circumstance for Brazil, whereas, for Nepal, Salvi (2007) concludes
that family background has little effect and instead infrastructure and ethnicity
are the most influential circumstances.
We can conclude that a lot of work has been done so far, but also that a
lot remains to be done. Inequality of opportunity can be computed in many
ways. The theoretical basis of many measures needs further scrutiny. At the
present stage, especially the direct measurement and the norm based measures
have attractive features, but more thought on the choice of reference values is
necessary. It would also be interesting to know how sensitive the ranking of
different countries is to the measure chosen, and whether differences in rankings
are due to conceptual differences between the measures. This requires that the
same data set is used to compute all measures.
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